In this paper, we study a learning problem in which a forecaster only observes partial information. By properly rescaling the problem, we heuristically derive a limiting PDE on Wasserstein space which characterizes the asymptotic behavior of the regret of the forecaster. Using a verification type argument, we show that the problem of obtaining regret bounds and efficient algorithms can be tackled by finding appropriate smooth sub/supersolutions of this parabolic PDE.

We explicitly solve the nonlinear PDE that is the continuous limit of dynamic programming of \emph{expert prediction problem} in finite horizon setting with $N=4$ experts. The \emph{expert prediction problem} is formulated as a zero sum game between a player and an adversary. By showing that the solution is $\mathcal{C}^2$, we are able to show that the strategies conjectured in arXiv:1409.3040G form an asymptotic Nash equilibrium. We also prove the "Finite vs Geometric regret" conjecture proposed in arXiv:1409.3040G for $N=4$, and we give a stronger conjecture which characterizes the relation between the finite and geometric stopping.